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SO:  This is Dr Sue Onslow interviewing the Most Honourable PJ Patterson in 
Kingston, Jamaica, on Thursday, 22nd January 2015. Thank you very 
much, Sir, for agreeing to take part in this interview project on the 
history of the Commonwealth. 
  
 I wondered if you could begin, please, by reflecting on how you 
regarded the Commonwealth when you came into politics, because 
yours is a very long political career. 
 
PJP: My first meeting with the Commonwealth Heads was in 1973, at which time I 
was the Minister responsible for Industry, Tourism and Foreign Trade. The 
meeting was held in Canada [and] Prime Minister Trudeau presided. The 
meeting, for the first time, [centred on] the need for the Commonwealth to 
focus not only on the political issues of the day but those pertaining to 
economic and trade relationships, hence my participation in that capacity.  
 
At that meeting, Michael Manley was persuaded to host the next meeting of 
Heads, which took place in Jamaica in 1975. I still held the same portfolio but 
I was the Minister largely responsible for the organisation of the conference. 
All Ministers were assigned the responsibility of meeting Heads on their 
arrival, and mine included Prime Minister Trudeau and Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson. 
 
Harold Wilson was also taking the opportunity to break ground for the British 
High Commission which was being built on land that had been owned by the 
British Government and kept by them – even after our independence – in 
Trafalgar Park. That meeting signified a major turn in the affairs of the 
Commonwealth, particularly with the focus on the Liberation Movements in 
Southern Africa. Prime Minister Michael Manley invited representatives from 
both Rhodesia – as it then was – and South Africa, to be present in the 
meeting. 
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SO: Do you recall if SWAPO representatives come to the Kingston meeting, 
as well as the ANC, ZANU and ZAPU? 
 
PJP: I don’t recall SWAPO being at that meeting but, certainly, we had continued 
exchanges with them – to which I can attest after my becoming the Foreign 
Minister in 1977. But I remember particularly Prime Minister Trudeau insisting 
that the discussions with those representatives would have to be informal, so 
that the sign designations of countries for different delegations had to 
disappear from the conference room.  
 
It was the first time that Commonwealth Heads were speaking directly with 
representatives of those countries where the fight for liberation was waging 
intensely. In those discussions, Heads were able to hear directly how the 
Commonwealth would be expected to assist in their struggle. One of the 
results of that discussion was an acceptance by Heads that, in dealing with 
the problems of land-locked countries – Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi in 
particular… 
 
SO: Botswana too? 
 
PJP: Botswana was not in that particular discussion because the problems there 
related more to being surrounded by South African territory, in the main. 
 
But in relation to these land-locked countries, Mozambique had been making 
a tremendous sacrifice in allowing, particularly, their mineral goods to have 
access to the sea through their ports. That triggered an acceptance that some 
support – largely at a technical level – would have to be given to 
Mozambique. That was a precursor for the association which began between 
the Commonwealth and Mozambique and which led, eventually, to their 
application and their acceptance to become a full member of the 
Commonwealth. 
 
SO: Did FRELIMO representatives also attend the Kingston meeting in any 
way? Were they there on the periphery of the Kingston meeting? 
 
PJP: No, I don’t recall Mozambique and FRELIMO having any presence at that 
meeting. I should mention that Jamaica, which was at the forefront of the 
Non-Aligned Movement, would have had interface with both FRELIMO and 
SWAPO, and certainly we would [have been] aware of their concerns. 
Guyana, which was also very active in the Non-Aligned Movement and at that 
time was represented by the Foreign Minister Shridath Ramphal, would have 
been able to bring those concerns to attention, even though they were not 
physically present at the meeting. 
 
 The other significant thing from that meeting was the focus on economic 
issues. As a result of very intense discussions – one led by Harold Wilson for 
the developed countries and the other led by Forbes Burnham on behalf of 
the developing countries – there was a decision to set up two expert working 
committees to look at, among other things, how to reduce the gap between 
the developed and the developing world. I should mention that, at the meeting 
in Kingston, the United Kingdom was on the verge of entering the European 
Common Market and it would have been of grave concern to us – and 
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certainly Harold Wilson was aware of it – as to what would be the approaches 
and the sensitivities. The UK actually entered the European Common Market, 
but the negotiation for other countries of the Commonwealth had not yet been 
consummated. 
 
SO: You’re referring to the lead up to the Lomé Convention?  
 
PJP: That’s correct. 
 
SO: Sir, if I could ask, the international economic intellectual debate at the 
time was very much centred around the New International Economic 
Order… 
 
PJP: Very much so. 
 
SO: …and the need to address the lack of capital accumulation in the 
developing world. Were there any particular terms of reference – that 
you recall – for these two expert working committees? As it was the 
Commonwealth, was there a more consensual rather than an adversarial 
approach towards the established economic order? 
 
PJP: The precise terms of reference had been settled. In fact, some preparatory 
work had been done by us in the Caribbean in preparing for that conference, 
and they had, among other things, to examine terms of trade, financial flows, 
[and] access to educational opportunities. Sir Alister McIntyre was appointed 
as a coordinator of that working group and the representatives from the 
various countries. The formula was agreed there. 
 
SO: Sir, I’m aware that in the second part of the 1970s, Prime Minister 
Michael Manley was particularly keen on the idea of establishing a 
Common Fund... 
 
PJP: That’s correct. 
 
SO: …and worked with Malcolm Fraser on this. 
 
PJP: That came a bit later, after the Kingston Conference. At the Kingston 
Conference, Sir Shridath Ramphal was elected Secretary General by acclaim 
and, in his acceptance speech, he set out in clear terms how he saw the 
future of the Commonwealth and his own role as Secretary General. Indeed, 
he actually assumed office in Jamaica and then we proceeded to send him off 
in Montego Bay, where he gave certainly one of the most memorable 
presentations, as he departed, on the regional integration movement. When 
he assumed office, he made it clear that the issues which were being dealt 
with at a global level could not be ignored by the Commonwealth, particularly 
since the Commonwealth represented a unique combination of developed, 
middle-income and small island states. 
 
At that time, UNCTAD accepted the proposal to establish a Common Fund 
[for Commodities] and the Secretary General regarded it as part of his 
responsibility to ensure that the Commonwealth made a contribution to the 
dialogue on the Common Fund. I very well recall his convening a meeting of 
trade ministers at Marlborough House. By that time, I had the Cabinet position 
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of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Tourism. When he called me 
and I was questioning the possibilities of my being there – because I had, by 
then, a number of very serious travelling obligations – he persuaded me that 
Jamaica’s participation at the ministerial level was critical because, in 
Geneva, our Ambassador Herbie Walker had been appointed as Chairman of 
the Common Fund. Herbie Walker, incidentally, was my first Permanent 
Secretary when I assumed the responsibility as Minister of Industry, Tourism 
and Foreign Trade. 
 
SO: I have been told by economists who worked at the Secretariat that there 
was some tension between the G77 group and a Commonwealth 
position, because the G77 felt that a more consensual, Commonwealth 
approach undercut a negotiating position put forward by those who 
wanted to pursue a harder line with others in the developed world. Is 
that your recollection? 
 
PJP: Well, we were active in both the G77 and in the Commonwealth, and we 
would never have subscribed to a position being taken by the Commonwealth 
that would be divergent from that which was acceptable to the Group of 77. 
Now, the position of the Commonwealth may not have been as forceful as 
that of the G77, but it certainly would form the base of an agreement by the 
Commonwealth countries and really be a springboard from which we could 
move in our discussions to evolve a common G77 position. 
 
SO: Sir, please, if I could just take you back to that meeting in Kingston in 
1975. How much value did Prime Minister Michael Manley – with whom, 
of course, you worked extremely closely – attach to the 
Commonwealth? Or was it of lesser importance to him than the Non-
Aligned Movement and non-alignment? 
 
PJP: We never saw them as competing for the same influence and control. We 
recognised that essentially these were two very different groups. 
 
Certainly, the Non-Aligned [Movement] would have included a number of 
countries that were members of the Commonwealth, and even some 
countries that were eligible for Non-Aligned membership had chosen not to 
exercise it. It could be true to say that you would therefore expect more 
militancy on the part of the non-aligned than would be forthcoming from the 
Commonwealth. But to the extent that you could get Group B countries – as 
they are called – and developed countries, which were Commonwealth 
countries, sympathetic or supportive of elements that were in conformity with 
the non-aligned position, so much the better. 
 
SO: Sir, how much importance did Prime Minister Manley and yourself 
attach to having the new Secretary General of the Commonwealth come 
from Guyana, from the Caribbean region – someone who had been a 
very activist foreign minister for Guyana within the Non-Aligned 
Movement? Was that a very useful adjunctive for Jamaican diplomacy? 
 
PJP: The story is reflected in the book recently written by Sir Shridath: Glimpses of 
a Global Life. 
 
SO: Which I’ve read, yes. 
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PJP: When the idea [of Shridath Ramphal becoming the next Secretary General] 
was first mooted in London, it caught fire instantly because, certainly, by then, 
Shridath Ramphal had established his credentials in several fields: in the 
Non-Aligned Movement, in the ACP group where he was a lead negotiator, in 
the Commonwealth itself, and having participated as Foreign Minister in the 
Organisation of American States. So, there was ready acceptance, not 
because he was a Caribbean person but because he was eminently qualified 
to undertake that role. In the soundings, particularly from India, he was asked 
whether he would not be of greater service to the developing world by 
remaining an articulate ministerial spokesman than by moving into what some 
regarded as a moribund association like the Commonwealth. His response 
was, “We must change it. We must give it new life.” And that’s exactly what 
he set out to do: to mould a Secretariat that would have command and a 
voice that was respected internationally. 
 
Of course, from the Caribbean viewpoint, it was not only an 
acknowledgement that we were contributing to international dialogue but [also 
that] we knew we had someone who understood the problems of the region 
and would not ignore them in the discharge of his duties as Secretary 
General. 
 
SO: I’m aware that during Sir Shridath’s fifteen-year tenure in the position of 
Secretary General, the Commonwealth Secretariat – and indeed the 
Commonwealth itself – seems to have been particularly Secretary 
General-led or Secretary General-centric, to a remarkable degree. 
 
PJP: He stamped an imprimatur. I think I said in the launch of the book [that] he 
became the template by which other Secretary Generals can be measured, 
and this has been widely acknowledged by other Commonwealth Heads. 
Malcolm Fraser, Joe Clark, [and] Mrs Thatcher herself [all] recognised the 
quality of his work. 
 
SO: Sir, you’ve just mentioned Malcolm Fraser. Please could you reflect on 
the – it could be said – ‘unlikely’ political combination of Malcolm Fraser 
and Michael Manley, as two highly effective and focused 
Commonwealth Heads? 
 
PJP: Yes. I won’t say it’s because of their common love of cricket, [Laughter] 
although that was not disabling by any means. I think, from the point of view 
of a developed country, Malcolm Fraser had an awareness of the world 
around him and the role of Australia and where its real interests lay. Australia 
is a developed country, but in certain areas – like its mineral resources in 
relation to the treatment of agricultural products – it has a lot in common with 
a number of developing countries. 
 
SO: Yes, because of the importance of agricultural and mineral commodities 
to its foreign exchange earnings. 
 
PJP: That’s correct. And, certainly on the political side, Malcolm Fraser was as firm 
and fervent as ever that the atrocities that were evident in southern Africa 
were incompatible with the principles which guided the Commonwealth. 
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SO: As you have identified, the particular diplomatic focus and drive of the 
Commonwealth at this time was the resolution of the long-running 
Rhodesia problem. You mentioned the Zimbabwean liberation leaders 
who attended the Kingston meeting. I’m also aware that you attended 
the Lusaka Conference in 1979… 
 
PJP: No, I didn’t. I didn’t go to the Lusaka Conference. 
 
SO: Oh, I’m sorry: I have a note in my research papers that you did. 
 
PJP: No, no, but I’ll tell you what happened. At that time, I was the Foreign Minister 
and Deputy Prime Minister, and there were very few occasions when both the 
Prime Minister and myself would go [to one place together]. Prime Minister 
Manley went to Lusaka; I didn’t. But, as Foreign Minister, of course I would 
have been fully involved – not only in the preparation of the briefs that would 
go with the Jamaican delegation, but [also] in some of the consultations with 
other delegations which would have taken place prior to Lusaka. 
 
SO: And, of course, immediately after the Lusaka Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting, the Non-Aligned Movement meeting was held in 
Havana, in early September 1979. 
 
PJP: That’s correct, and that was a meeting where we were both present. 
 
SO: Wasn’t the Non-Aligned Movement meeting in Havana the turning point 
in persuading Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo to attend the 
Lancaster House discussions? I know that they were not at all happy 
with what had come out of the Lusaka meeting: an all-party 
constitutional conference to be convened in London. 
 
PJP: Yes, it was difficult, but yes, I think that was the meeting. One too often fails 
to appreciate that what takes place when Heads assemble is not confined to 
what takes place in the public meetings and conferences, but in the 
discussions that take place on the side. It was in those discussions on the 
side that we were able to persuade those delegations to participate in the 
Lancaster House meeting. 
 
SO: Thank you. I’ve always wondered; thank you very much for that. I also 
have a quotation from a press conference you gave, in which you said: 
“I can say to you, Jamaica was very influential in securing the final 
breakthrough at Lancaster House. One of the important things was the 
acceptance that they would not change the Constitution for a specific 
period to deal with things like land, because in the interim, the UK and 
the US Governments would, between them, make capital available for its 
purchase.” 
 
PJP: That’s correct. 
 
SO: So, were you in constant discussion and contact with the Patriotic Front 
leaders? 
 
PJP: Yes, and the thing you should remember [is that] this was on the eve of 
elections in the United States and Carrington had had discussions with 
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Secretary Vance. I think we all felt that, between them, funding was going to 
be provided to compensate for the land that would have to be acquired from 
the white settlers in Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. The defeat of Carter and the 
election of Reagan changed all that. 
 
SO: I know that Sir Shridath was very instrumental… 
 
PJP: That’s correct. 
 
SO: …in helping to broker the diplomatic promise on the land question, 
behind the scenes at the Lancaster House discussions. 
 
PJP: Once the Carter regime was out and the Reagan regime was in, and the 
Thatcher Government was in place, there was no pursuit of that. 
 
SO: That is a tragedy, because Lord Carrington – in conjunction with 
Secretary Cyrus Vance – did not simply make the promise of 
unspecified, substantial funds, which was the clincher in the October 
crisis over land. Before Zimbabwe’s independence, in March 1980, 
Thatcher wrote to President Carter asking could he put up more money, 
because Britain intended to do so, too. I’ve seen President Carter’s 
positive response, written in the April of 1980, promising further funds. 
 
PJP: Which, perhaps, is a good point for me to say something about Zimbabwe. 
The understanding when we left Lancaster House was that there would be no 
changes in the Constitution of Rhodesia for a certain period, but those 
changes would take place after an interval which would coincide with the 
acquisition of property for which there would be compensation funded largely 
by the United Kingdom and the United States. 
 
SO: And the understanding, then, that after the ten-year period the ‘willing 
buyer’/‘willing seller’ approach – by which property rights were 
embedded in that Lancaster House Constitution – would be moderated? 
 
PJP: That is correct. Which to a great extent, when that commitment was not 
honoured, made Mugabe proceed: one, with the alteration of the Constitution, 
and two, without any funds to pay for compensation for the land which he had 
acquired. Jamaica was very much involved, in total support, with Zimbabwe to 
secure its independence. The most iconic figure at that celebration…you 
would never guess who it was… 
 
SO: Bob Marley. 
 
PJP: Bob Marley! 
 
SO: Singing in Rufaro Stadium with the Wailers! 
 
PJP: Let me tell you this. I led the delegation from Jamaica because, at that time, 
we were coming up to elections in 1980 and it was decided, after 
considerable thought, that the Prime Minister couldn’t go. So, I was chosen to 
go. Well, I went down on the same plane with Bob Marley. Forbes Burnham, 
who was leading the Guyanese delegation, was also there. When we arrived 
in Salisbury – as it then was, Harare as it now is – the crowd invaded the 
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airfield, and Bob Marley’s feet never touched the ground until he reached his 
hotel. They lifted him off and took him right through!  
 
 I’ll give you another titbit. When they were about to unfurl the Zimbabwean 
flag, a deal had to be made because he was still singing in the stadium and 
nobody was leaving. The deal was that, if he stopped, he would give another 
concert the following night, so that the concert could have stopped then and 
the ceremonials could proceed. 
 
So, we have been integral to that struggle, and perhaps that was what 
influenced the Chairman of the Abuja Conference in 2003 to have asked me 
to chair the Prime Ministerial group looking at the situation in Zimbabwe. 
 
SO: Sir, you also welcomed Robert Mugabe here, in Jamaica, in 1996? 
 
PJP: Several times. 
 
SO: And he’s been awarded the highest honour in Jamaica. 
 
PJP: Oh, yes. Several times, several times. 
 
SO: So, you had a particularly strong political relationship? 
 
PJP: Oh, we got along extremely well. He would refer to me always as “my brother, 
my brother”. When I knew that what we had worked out in Abuja was going to 
end up as it did, I remember very well the conversations that were held 
between President Obasanjo, President Thabo Mbeki and myself with him. 
We spoke from Abuja by telephone to him in Harare. I knew we were in real 
trouble after the others had spoken to him and I was to have my turn in 
speaking to him. Instead of his saying “my brother”, he said, “Mr Patterson”. 
 
SO: Ah. 
 
PJP: And I knew that he was really confirming what he had said to Obasanjo and 
Mbeki: that, if there is going to be a suspension, Zimbabwe no longer has an 
interest in being a member of that sort of association. 
 
SO: Don McKinnon underlines in his memoirs that you knew Robert Mugabe 
very well, and that you had everyone’s confidence that you would be 
able to – as Don McKinnon put it – “do it right”. But how far was there 
also intense debate within that committee – between the SADC 
members, represented by Thabo Mbeki and President Chissano of 
Mozambique, and the other members, such as John Howard…?  
 
PJP: Well, I’d say this. The group included Australia, and John Howard was a 
hardliner. He wanted the expulsion of Zimbabwe. Chretien was also a 
member of that group and he was, I think, a moderating influence. There were 
those who felt there should be no sanction of any kind, but we were bound to 
consider this matter in accordance with the Harare Declaration, and that was 
the Declaration which had defined criteria for membership. The report from 
CMAG which came to us had pointed out deficiencies in the critical area of 
the elections for a parliamentary democracy. 
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SO: This stemmed from the Zimbabwe parliamentary elections in 2002, 
which had precipitated the critical Commonwealth election observer 
mission report? 
 
PJP: Yes, [on] the rule of law, the functions and roles of the judiciary and the 
freedom of the press. Sympathetic as we were to the disappointment, the 
upset and the understandable grief which the failure to implement the 
Lancaster House understandings had driven Mugabe to the position we had 
to examine, we could not but conclude that there had to be a period when 
Zimbabwe should be given the opportunity to conform with those principles 
and standards which had been set by the Harare Declaration. 
 
In our recommendation to the meeting, we had set out a very well thought out 
procedure for assisting Zimbabwe in which South Africa, led by Mbeki, would 
have played a critical role. The SADC countries and Nigeria were also willing 
to assist. We had actually identified emissaries that were going to work with 
Zimbabwe but, you know, Zimbabwe had made up its mind. It was going to 
go. So, it made a simultaneous announcement from Harare that they were 
quitting. 
 
SO: Yes. Sir, you must have felt a particular sadness because of your long 
friendship, and because Robert Mugabe had been such an advocate of 
the Harare principles after 1991. 
 
PJP: Definitely. As I said, we had a very, very warm relationship. I had been to 
Zimbabwe, I think, three times through my Prime Minister tenure and I think 
he’d been here three or four times. We had a very good working relationship. 
 
SO: Sir, thank you for filling in those details for me. If I could just take you 
back to reflect about the value of Commonwealth Heads of 
Governments Meetings in a general sense. You have mentioned the 
Kingston and Lusaka meetings. How much importance did you attach to 
these heads of government summits, and how did you see them change 
during your political contact with other Commonwealth heads? 
 
PJP: As I mentioned before, there are times when what happens outside meetings 
can be more valuable and important than what happens inside. By that I 
mean…you develop personal working relationships which, at times, can make 
all the difference in relation both to bilateral and sometimes multilateral 
affairs.   
 
Everyone recognises there are several respects in which the Commonwealth 
is truly unique. As I mentioned before, it includes developed countries, it 
includes developing countries. It includes Christian countries, Muslim 
countries, Hindu countries. It’s multi-ethnic, and although we converse in 
English, it’s also multilingual. It also has an unusual weight of small island 
states – small countries with small economies – and it also includes land-
locked countries. These all relate to problems which have to be dealt with at 
the international level. To the extent that the Commonwealth provides some 
bridge of understanding, it has a purpose. It has been of great importance in 
terms of the technical studies and technical assistance which it has been able 
to give. Unfortunately, that is diminishing, and it is one of the areas of concern 
to those who believe the Commonwealth has a future.  
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Even for those who question whether the Commonwealth is still useful or 
relevant, the answer comes from the number of people who have been 
seeking to join. [This] is what led the conference in Malta in late 2005 to 
decide that criteria for membership should be developed, and the 
establishment of a committee which I was asked to Chair since my retirement 
on the criteria for membership. 
 
SO: That was 2006-07. 
 
PJP: That’s correct. We met, deliberated, [and] sent our recommendations to the 
Uganda Conference, which were accepted and allowed for the admission of 
Rwanda [to the Commonwealth]. The reason for that acceptance was that, 
although Rwanda never had any relationship with the UK as a colony, it 
sufficiently related to a number of Commonwealth countries in the particular 
area and that would be criteria sufficient to allow them for admission. It also 
has implications throughout the regional movements including CARICOM, 
where places like Suriname and Haiti don’t belong to the Commonwealth 
tradition. 
 
SO: How much was there an enduring concern for the ‘cultural adulteration’ 
that might accompany expansion of the Commonwealth? This is a 
phrase that I have encountered in reports on the Commonwealth in the 
1990s: Cameroon had joined, Mozambique had joined in 1995, and I am 
aware Yemen as well as the Palestine Liberation Authority were also 
interested in applying for membership. 
 
PJP: Yes. Well, in respect of the Palestine Liberation Authority, the decision was 
that such an application would only fall for consideration when its independent 
status had been settled because Palestine, of course, has linkages with the 
United Kingdom before the creation of Israel. What we did say is that for the 
present and the foreseeable future, communication would have to be in 
English. The moment you get into a proliferation of languages, you’re getting 
into levels of expenditure which would make the Commonwealth budget 
require very, very substantial inputs. 
 
SO: It would, especially if it involved production of multiple copies of 
documents in varying languages. But it would also erode that very 
‘outer diplomacy’, the ‘quiet word’ on the fringes of meetings, that 
you’ve made reference to. 
 
PJP: Yes. 
 
SO: I’m aware that Senator Hugh Segal argued for an expansion of the 
Commonwealth and that the criteria that you set out was that an 
aspirant should be a sovereign state with a historic connection to an 
existing member or group. 
 
PJP: Yes, and there was also some suggestion that portions of state, like 
Somaliland, should be eligible for consideration, and we said no. We’re not 
going to go into existing nation states and pick out parts of it and say, “You 
can belong” and leave others. No. 
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SO: In your year-long discussions, you obviously convened regular 
meetings, supported by the designated officer from the Secretariat. Do 
you recall being the recipient, particularly, of arguments from Uganda in 
Rwanda’s case?  
 
PJP: Not in our meetings, no. Uganda did not have membership of our committee 
and it happened to go to Uganda because that was where we had decided in 
Malta that the meeting of Heads should be. It is a coincidence that that is 
where the question of Rwanda fell for consideration, but no, there was no 
pressure from any particular country. We said [that] once you are part of a 
regional integration process where there is a substantial connection with the 
Commonwealth, you should not be excluded from consideration, if all the 
other criteria for membership were satisfied. 
 
SO: Sir, can I ask you just to reflect, then… By 2006-07, the Commonwealth 
had grown dramatically from its original small size in 1949, with the 
happy re-inclusion of South Africa after 1994 and the inclusion of 
Mozambique. From one viewpoint, this produced a particular SADC 
bloc. There is, of course, a CARICOM bloc; there is a grouping of the 
South Pacific Forum, [and] the Indian Ocean Commission. How far do 
you see that the Commonwealth is, in fact, promoting regionalism, or is 
it becoming something of a victim of regionalism, because it’s getting 
so much bigger? 
 
PJP: I think it must never see regionalism as a threat to its existence. I think it is 
obliged to – and can contribute meaningfully to – bridging regional 
differences. 
 
SO: Sir, given your own particular political background and experience, how 
far are you unusual in the Jamaican political spectrum in terms of 
promoting a particular regionalist approach, rather than a Jamaican 
national approach? Of course, they aren’t necessarily conflicting in any 
way, but I’m just wondering to what extent, Sir, you are unusual? 
 
PJP: I’ll tell it very simply. I entered the University College of the West Indies in 
1954 as a Jamaican aware of the region. I and virtually everybody in my time 
left that university as a regionalist.  
 
I have said repeatedly that I envisage the Caribbean as an area where we 
pool our sovereignty, because there are so many areas in which integration 
can assist us in dealing with our individual concerns and realising our full 
potential as a people. Indeed, when you look at the increase of regional 
movements throughout the world, it’s the way everybody needs to go. This is 
nowhere more evident than Europe.   
 
There will be strains and you might even have, as you did recently, a  
referendum to determine whether, after 400 years of Union, Scotland should 
move separately. But the world is moving more and more towards regional 
blocs. 
 
SO: Yes, which enhance a national voice. 
 
PJP: That’s correct. 
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SO: Indeed. Sir, if I could ask you as a general last group of questions about 
this notion of the personal chemistry and diplomacy that goes on 
between Heads. I made reference to the changing size of the 
Commonwealth. Obviously, the institution of the Retreat was designed 
precisely to underpin private trust and contact in 1973. By the time you 
became Prime Minister in 1992, it had become a different 
Commonwealth – it was a very different international environment. 
Could you reflect on your relationship with other key Commonwealth 
Heads during your fourteen-year Premiership, besides Robert Mugabe? 
 
PJP: Yes, well there are some with whom I have worked as Foreign Minister: 
Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania [and] Chissano of Mozambique. I had known 
President Obasanjo from his previous tenure as the military head of Nigeria. 
I’m not going to list the Caribbean leaders for the reason that we also worked 
with them in CARICOM. 
 
SO: I’m wondering particularly about, for instance, Prime Minister John 
Major. So much discussion is addressed to Thatcher… 
 
PJP: My first meeting as Prime Minister was in Cyprus and John Major was the 
Prime Minister at that time. He was particularly concerned about matters 
pertaining to international trade – with the emergence of the WTO to replace  
GATT arrangements – and I worked with him as part of a committee to give a 
report to Heads on the position we would take. We developed a very good 
working relationship. The fact that we were both cricket lovers didn’t hurt!  
 
 [Laughter] 
 
SO: He is indeed passionate about cricket! 
 
PJP: [Laughter] Oh, he is, he is! Certainly we developed not just a mutual respect 
but a very, very good working relationship. In fact, I tried several times to 
persuade him to come on an unofficial visit to Jamaica. I wasn’t successful.  
Then he retired, [and] he’s come nearly every year. When I was in office – 
there was a period when I was still in while he had left… 
 
SO: Yes, 1997. 
 
PJP: Yes. I’ve seen him, and now that we’re both retired we have regular contact 
and I have a very, very healthy respect for him. Chretien, I have mentioned. 
Canada and Jamaica have a long working relationship, but at a personal 
level, it’s been very good; it’s been very warm. He calls me “Pi Je”, with his 
French accent! [Laughter] He is a man that speaks his mind. 
 
SO: Yes. 
 
PJP: He doesn’t go around and around. Well, President Obasanjo…We’ve got a 
long working relationship. We work very well together. President Rawlings of 
Ghana and John Kufuor who succeeded him: again, I found those personal 
relationships very, very helpful. Kikwete succeeded Mkapa and, again, there’s 
a brief period of overlap, but I had known Kikwete from the time he was 
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Foreign Minister. So, I have been in this thing for a long time. Perhaps too 
long, eh? 
 
SO: Sir, thank you for your emphasis on the importance of the network of 
Heads, the network of Ministers, and officials. It has always struck me 
that the Commonwealth’s trump card is its multiple networks. Sir, in 
addition to looking at international trade, I know John Major was also 
particularly keen to address money laundering and the debt issue. 
 
PJP: Yes. 
 
SO: Could you reflect on the value and work of the Commonwealth on those 
two particular aspects?   
 
PJP: Well, money laundering is a matter of international concern because it’s 
linked with drugs and with illicit trafficking. So, there’s a common global 
interest in dealing with that. On the question of debt, the Caribbean and 
Jamaica have been at the forefront in raising the question of the level of 
indebtedness and the limitations it places on economic growth and human 
development. Major responded by affording some relief in particular areas 
where a number of countries have been concerned. 
 
SO: Sir, from 1992, you yourself were one of the key Commonwealth leaders 
trying to encourage some form of an operational arm of the Harare 
Principles, in the form of CMAG. Could you just add some comment, 
because so often it seems that CMAG emerged from the Auckland 
Summit because of the crisis in Nigeria... 
 
PJP: That’s correct. 
 
SO: …but obviously there was an important background story to that? 
 
PJP: No, we felt that there should be some monitoring device. I think there are a 
number of international organisations and bodies which have what you might 
call the ‘Troika’ which operates between summits. The Commonwealth has 
never really had the equivalent, and the person who hosts the meeting is 
generally acclaimed as the lead Head for that meeting. But almost 
immediately, the meeting ends, [and] there’s much more that an incoming 
host has to do without having any formal executive or authority. 
 
When things occur in between – whether it is in Fiji or in Pakistan – and 
there’s a need for some sort of response, we need to have a body that can 
invigilate the operations of the Harare Principles to what is happening. So, 
CMAG was constituted to enable us to do that. 
 
SO: As you were one of the key supporters of the CMAG idea before it 
formally emerged, what was your view of CMAG in action during your 
time as Prime Minister? You’ve made reference to it, over Zimbabwe… 
 
PJP: Look, look, look…From time to time, questions are being raised about the 
balance. That’s always going to...There was a time when Zimbabwe itself was 
a member of the CMAG group. 
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SO: Indeed, the Zimbabwean Foreign Minister Stan Mudenge was the first 
Chair. 
 
PJP: Yes. So, I think [that], on the whole, it has discharged its responsibilities well. 
 
SO: I just wondered if you felt like Dr Mahathir, who wrote to President Bill 
Clinton within the year of CMAG formally being set up, saying, “They 
can’t get through the door to talk to Abacha. You need to do something, 
Mr President…” 
 
PJP: Okay, it’s so good you mentioned Dr Mahathir. How could I, in talking about 
Commonwealth Heads, not make special mention of him? Dr Mahathir is very 
much on the forefront of those who commanded and earned my full respect 
and, again, with whom I would be extremely happy to work. And not only in 
the Commonwealth: we had a G-15 of which both Mahathir and myself were 
members and which, at different times, each of us have hosted. That’s a 
group with Egypt, Zimbabwe, Algeria, Venezuela…It’s a group of developing 
countries created by the non-aligned. 
 
SO: Yes, Sir Sonny Ramphal and Dr Mahathir crafted this idea in about 1989. 
 
PJP: Yes, G-15. But, certainly, Malaysia under him was very vocal, very active, 
[and] very influential, in a positive way, in the deliberations of the 
Commonwealth. 
 
SO: And I think that was very warming to those who were committed to the 
Commonwealth because, initially, when he became Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, Dr Mahathir was quite sceptical of its value and contemplated 
at one point pulling out. 
 
PJP: Listen, in all these things, it’s what you make of it. You can either go in, look 
at it, say you don’t like it and leave, or you go in, look at it and say, “Listen, 
this is how I would like to see it evolve. Let me help in shaping it.” 
 
SO: So, Prime Minister Manley wasn’t being serious when he told the 
journalist in the late 1970s that, “I’m thinking of taking Jamaica out of 
the Commonwealth”, saying he wanted to focus on the Non-Aligned 
Movement instead? 
 
PJP: No, I wouldn’t say he wasn’t serious. He may have been reflecting at the time 
some particular upset. But, certainly, he was a very significant contributor to 
the Commonwealth. The Gleneagles Agreement…he was right at the front of 
it. And even the Harare Declaration: again, he was very much a contributor to 
it. 
 
SO: So, while you were Prime Minister, after 1992, what was your particular 
view and perspective on the role and importance of the Secretaries 
General – Chief Emeka Anyaoku and then Sir Don McKinnon? 
 
PJP: I had known Chief Anyaoku when he was Deputy. When he succeeded to the 
office, I think he brought profound understanding of the working relationships, 
exactly as I mentioned. Of course, he was very, very knowledgeable, 
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particularly as it related to the African states. He was, and he continued to be, 
cognisant of the concerns of the Caribbean and we worked well together. 
 
I had known his successor when he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
New Zealand. I supported McKinnon’s candidature. 
 
SO: You led his campaign in 1999? 
 
PJP: I wouldn’t say I led his campaign – that might be a bit of an overstatement. I 
strongly supported him. 
 
SO: In contrast to Thabo Mbeki, who was supporting a very different 
candidate? 
 
PJP: Yes, well, how shall I call it? Certainly, it never reached a point of conflict. I 
thought McKinnon was well suited for the job and I supported him and so did 
most of the Caribbean. Again, I think he tried to proceed with the work 
entrusted to him.  
 
I think, with diminishing resources, the Secretariat has not been able to 
contribute as much as it previously did to technical work, to technical 
assistance, and as strongly as it did to the international dialogue. I think, also, 
that the intensity for the Commonwealth which existed in the fight against 
apartheid and colonialism has diminished. The Commonwealth has lost some 
of its firepower, because that hasn’t been replaced by any issue of equal 
preoccupation. 
 
SO: And, it could be said, immediate media attention. 
 
PJP: Well, in what is happening in the world today, I think the Commonwealth has 
to try and define its role. 
 
SO: Sir, in helping to raise the profile and value of the Commonwealth, how 
much importance would you attach to the Queen as Head? 
 
PJP: I attach great importance to that. I will be plain: I am for a republican form of 
government in Jamaica, but the Queen as the Head of the Commonwealth, 
certainly, I enthusiastically endorse. I’m talking now not just about the 
position: I’m talking about the person. I think she has been an unbelievable 
source of inspiration, of good and of being able to hold everybody together. I 
think I said in something that I wrote in Sir Shridath’s book that, the Queen 
apart, he, perhaps, has been the most [powerful] single influence in the shape 
of the Commonwealth. And I say “the Queen apart” because I think she has 
played that role. What will happen after? My gifts of prophecy now don’t allow 
me to venture there. [Laughter] 
 
SO: As my final question, how important do you think are the 
Commonwealth Games? Jamaica is a leader in the field of athletics. Do 
the Commonwealth Games play any soft power political role for 
Jamaica? 
 
PJP: Yes, and actually the President of the Commonwealth Games for the longest 
time, Michael Fennell…he’s a classmate of mine. [Laughter] It’s trivial in one 
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way, but certainly in endorsement of the Commonwealth Games…One of the 
things I said in Cyprus in my first intervention as Prime Minister was that the 
future of the Commonwealth depends on bringing our young people together, 
and nothing does that better than the Games. So, I think it’s very important, 
and not only because we get a haul of medals! [Laughter] 
 
SO: Usain Bolt certainly set Glasgow alight at the Commonwealth Games 
last summer. 
 
PJP: He really did. He truly did. 
 
SO:  Sir, thank you very much indeed.   
 
 
 [END OF AUDIOFILE] 
